



Income tax progressivity, growth, income inequality
and welfare
Cruz A. Echevarría
Received: 10 May 2013 / Accepted: 13 November 2014 / Published online: 23 December 2014
© The Author(s) 2014. This article is published with open access at SpringerLink.com
Abstract This paper analyzes the effects of personal income tax progressivity on
long-run economic growth, income inequality and social welfare. The quantitative
implications of income tax progressivity increments are illustrated for the US econ-
omy under three main headings: individual effects (reduced labor supply and savings,
and increased dispersion of tax rates); aggregate effects (lower GDP growth and lower
income inequality); and welfare effects (lower dispersion of consumption across indi-
viduals and higher leisure levels, but also lower growth of future consumption). The
social discount factor proves to be crucial for this third effect: a higher valuation of
future generations’ well-being requires a lower level of progressivity. Additionally, if
tax revenues are used to provide a public good rather than just being discarded, a higher
private valuation of such public goods will also call for a lower level of progressivity.
Keywords Growth · Income tax progressivity · Income inequality · Welfare
JEL Classification H20 · O41
1 Introduction
Income tax progressivity helps to attain a more equal distribution of income, wealth
and consumption. Additionally, in the presence of uninsurable uncertainty (whether
because it is of aggregate nature, or being of idiosyncratic type, insurance markets
are missing), progressive taxation provides some partial insurance and less volatile
household consumption over time. The counterpart, however, is that progressive taxa-
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tion introduces incentive distortions for labor supply, saving and investment decisions
of private economic agents.
The optimal degree of progressivity of income taxation has been, and still is, a
live issue among academic researchers which point out challenging results in several
directions. But it is also an issue of concern among policy practitioners as the recent
crisis has forced many governments to look for new sources of revenue, and higher
and more progressive taxes seem to be on their schedules, raising the corresponding
policy debate.
The issue dates back to Mirrlees (1971) seminal paper, so that the economic liter-
ature has produced some major works on the subject since then. Hubbard and Judd
(1986) find that an exemption and a highermarginal tax rate can in some cases improve
efficiency relative to a proportional tax, so that some degree of progressivity may be
desirable. Conesa and Krueger (2006) find that the optimal US total income tax code
is well approximated by a flat tax rate of 17.2% and a fixed deduction of about $9,400.
In a similar set-up, Conesa et al. (2009) conclude that, also for the US case, the optimal
capital income tax (flat) rate is 36%, while the optimal progressive labor income tax
consists of a flat tax of 23% with a deduction of $7,200. In a closely related paper,
Peterman (2014) finds that the introduction of human capital causes a 4.7% increase
in the optimal capital tax and a notably flatter optimal labor income tax. Carroll and
Young (2011) find that increases in the progressivity of the income tax schedule are
associated with long-run distributions with greater aggregate income, wealth, capi-
tal and labor, and lower income inequality and higher wealth inequality. Diamond
and Saez (2011) and Kindermann and Krueger (2014) suggest that the optimal labor
income tax rate for the top earners would imply a marginal tax rate as high as 73% or
even 90%. Bakis et al. (2014) find that when the transitional dynamics are ignored,
the optimal tax policy for the long-run steady state is moderately regressive; when
the transition path is considered, however, the optimal tax reform is much more pro-
gressive. Along similar lines, some other authors suggest that the revenue-maximizing
marginal tax rate for the top earners should be at least 36.9% (see Guner et al. 2014b),
or even around 53% (see Badel and Huggett 2014). It is worth pointing out that a fea-
ture common to all these previous references is that economic growth is either absent
or made exogenous.
Switching to works of endogenous growth, and focusing on the US economy, Cau-
cutt et al. (2003) build up an OLG model where growth is driven by human capital
investment. They find that reductions in the progressivity of labor income tax can in
themselves have positive growth effects and decrease inequality: the annual per capita
growth rate along the balanced-growth path would rise by up to 0.52% by eliminating
progressivity. Benabou (2002) sets up an infinitely-lived agents model of human capi-
tal accumulation, concluding that long run growth would be maximized if the average
marginal tax rate for labor income were 34.8%, giving rise to a 0.5% increment in
the long run growth rate (see Tang and King 2005 for a correction). Li and Sarte
(2004) modify Rebelo (1991) and Barro (1990) original endogenous growth models
to account for progressive taxes, finding that the progressivity decrease implied by
the 1986 Tax Reform Act helped raise U.S. per capita GDP growth between 0.12 and
0.34%.
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Echevarria (2012) builds a two-period OLG economy with aggregate uncertainty
and in which young individuals’ savings in the form of physical capital drive growth
through an AK technology, individuals’ age being the only (trivial) source of het-
erogeneity as individuals pertaining to the same generation are all alike. Assuming
inelastic labor supply and recursive preferences, necessary and sufficient conditions
are obtained for the introduction of a progressive income tax in a flat income tax econ-
omy to induce a reduction in the growth rate, the intertemporal rate of substitution in
consumption proving to be a key parameter. The model is numerically illustrated for
the U.S. economy, showing that the long-run GDP growth rate would be maximized
under a regressive income tax.
In this paper I set up an economy model that partly draws on Echevarria (2012). As
in that paper, I assume a two-period, OLG economy populated by non-altruistic indi-
viduals in which government expenditure, representing a constant fraction of GDP,
is financed via a progressive personal income tax, physical capital accumulation in
an AK fashion being the engine of growth. Therefore, this set up differs from that in
Caucutt et al. (2003) where human capital accumulation gives the growth generat-
ing mechanism. Once physical capital accumulation is adopted, the AK specification
proves useful as it simplifies both the algebra and the numerical computation because
transitional dynamics are precluded.
Additionally, here I introduce some added features. First, young individuals’ labor
supply is elastic. This is a must ingredient when, as in this paper, labor and capital
income end up being taxed differently. This is so not because labor and capital income
are taxed separately as in Conesa et al. (2009), but because in the simple economy that I
build up young (active) individuals live only on labor income, old (retired) individuals
live only on capital income, and, in general, young and old individuals’ incomes are
different.1 This assumption alone implies one key differencewith respect to Echevarria
(2012). The (negative) growth effect of income tax progressivity is reinforced, as a
higher tax progressivity is shown to lead to substantial reductions in individuals’ labor
supply which further reduce young individuals’ savings.
Second, I assume that individuals differ in their skills or innate labor productivi-
ties, thereby allowing for an intra-generational heterogeneity absent in that paper and
which, in turn, allows us to approximate the observed income distribution. Along the
same lines, market or before-tax income distribution now becomes endogenous, as the
tax policy now does influence labor and savings decisions of different type individuals
in a different way.
Third, perfect foresight is assumed. When risk aversion is properly treated, so that
attitudes toward risk and intertemporal consumption substitutability are independently
modelled, previous works in the literature have proven that the effect of income taxa-
tion on the equilibrium growth rate mainly depends on the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption, while the role played by aggregate uncertainty or indi-
viduals’ risk aversion is a minor one. In other words, deterministic models offer a
reasonable first approximation to the effects of taxes on growth. See, e.g. Echevarria
(2012, 2013), Mauro (1995) or Smith (1996).
1 Gervais (2009) proves that progressive taxation can imitate optimal age-dependent proportional tax rates
to some extent as earnings vary over the lifetime of individuals.
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Fourth, the progressive tax schedule introduced by Li and Sarte (2004) is here
replaced by that in Heathcote et al. (2014). Despite being similar in nature, the latter
formulation allows one to set both a lower and an upper bound on the progressivity
index which have natural interpretations: proportional taxation and maximum redis-
tribution in that net-of-tax incomes are equalized across taxpayers, respectively.
And, fifth, when discussing welfare implications of tax progressivity, a special
reference is made to the destination that the government selects for tax proceeds.
Contrary to the usual assumption that tax revenues are just wasted (so that no public
investment is made nor a consumption good entering the individuals’ utility function
is provided), in this paper I consider the case in which tax revenues are used to publicly
provide a consumption good.2 As I will show, even when this implies no change for
the equilibrium private allocation nor the equilibrium growth rate, the social welfare
maximizing progressivity of the income tax code does change.
The model here introduced is, therefore, characterized by basic features that,
although borrowed from previous works, when jointly considered make it depart from
those. It is an overlapping generations economy, but as opposed to Caucutt et al.
(2003), households are non-altruistic and have perfect foresight, growth is generated
by physical capital accumulation, the progressivity of the income tax applies not only
to labor income, but also to capital income, and progressive tax rates are endogenously
obtained rather than ex ante imposed. And unlike Echevarria (2012), perfect foresight,
intra-generational heterogeneity and elastic labor supply are assumed.
The results that I obtain are of a quantitative nature. The model economy is first
calibrated to mimic some stylized facts of the U.S. economy. Then, the following
revenue-neutral tax experiment is run: assuming that aggregate tax revenues are a
constant fraction of the economy’s aggregate output, I analyze both the individuals’
and the aggregate economy’s responses to (unannounced) changes in the progressivity
of the income tax code. The numerical results obtained are an illustration of the effects
of income tax progressivity upon economic growth, income inequality, and social
welfare.
The main predictions that the numerical analysis suggests fall under three main
categories: individual, aggregate, and social welfare related. A summary follows.
Concerning individual effects, increases in income tax progressivity induce drops
in labor supply of all types of individuals, and reductions in savings of all individuals
except for the least skilled, as a result of higher average tax rates borne by all individuals
except for the least skilled and lower average tax rates borne by the least skilled who
become subsidized.
Regarding aggregate effects, increments in income tax progressivity lead to a fall in
aggregate savings,which (given thegrowthmechanism in thismodel economy) implies
a lower equilibrium growth rate. Thus, eliminating the progressivity and moving to a
flat tax regime would raise the equilibrium annual growth rate of per capita GDP from
1.92 to 1.95%. Additionally, higher income tax progressivity reduces the inequality in
the distribution of both pre-tax and after-tax incomes. Thus, introducing a proportional
2 Li and Sarte (2004) is the exception, of course, as one of the models they study draws on Barro (1990).
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income tax code in the benchmark economy would increase the Gini indices of market
and net-of-tax incomes by 1 and 3.8%, respectively.
Finally, concerning social welfare effects, optimality imposes a political choice as
income tax progressivity leads to three effects: two positive, one negative. First, a more
equal distribution of net income and consumption levels across different types of indi-
viduals. Second, higher levels of leisure. And, third, a lower growth rate of consump-
tion. The size of this negative effect crucially depends on the social discount factor: as
the social planner values more future generations’ well-being, the optimal level of the
income tax progressivity will fall. Thus, if the social discount factor is almost zero,
then the optimal progressivity level will almost imply complete income redistribution
with a welfare gain equivalent to a 62.45% increment in lifetime consumption and a
negligible (close to zero) annual growth rate of per capita GDP. However, if the social
discount factor is high enough (around 1.2), the progressivity level will sharply fall
(although still above the benchmark economy value). In this case, the resulting small
fall in the annual growth rate of per capita GDP (from 1.92 to 1.87%) would imply a
welfare loss equivalent to a 15.01% fall in lifetime consumption.
In addition, if the government tax proceeds are devoted to the public provision
of some private good rather than discarded, the optimal progressivity level will also
depend on how households value this public provision relative to private consumption.
Thus, a higher valuation implies a lower optimal progressivity level, as progressivity
also reduces the growth rate of the government provided consumption. At any rate, and
for the parameter values considered, optimality requires some degree of progressivity.
And, not only do the optimal progressivity levels themselves depend negatively such
social and individual preference parameters, but so also do the respective quantitative
gains.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy. Sec-
tion 3 solves the equilibrium growth rate. Section 4 discusses welfare analysis. Section
5 provides numerical results. Section 6 concludes. An “Appendix” discusses the results
under the assumption that the government publicly provides a private consumption
good financed with the tax proceeds.
2 The economy
There are two sectors in the economy: a private one (households and firms) which
makes its decisions in a perfectly competitive market framework; and a government
which levies a progressive income tax to finance some exogenous level of expenditure
which, in this benchmark economy, is neither productive nor enters households’ pref-
erences. Later on, as a sensitivity analysis exercise, I will discuss how this assumption
might affect the results of the paper, in particular those related to individuals’ welfare.
As for households, this is an OLG economy, populated by a continuum of young
individuals and a continuum of old individuals which coexist at any time, in which
population is assumed to grow at an exogenous, constant rate, m ≥ 0. Therefore,
individuals differ in age and in their innate labor ability. Thisway, income redistribution
through progressive taxation takes place across individuals of different generations and
of different labor productivities living at the same time.
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The productive sector is represented by a continuumof competitive firms ofmeasure
one. All firms use the same production technology of constant returns to scale in capital
and labor and are exposed to a positive externality given by the aggregate stock of
capital per unit of labor. The appropriate choice of parameters will make firms exhibit
an aggregate AK technology in equilibrium, thereby allowing for the existence of
sustained growth.
2.1 Households
Suppose an i-th type individual born at time t who lives for 2 periods and obtains
utility from young and old period consumption (ci1,t and c
i
2,t+1, respectively) and
disutility from young period labor, nit ∈ (0, 1), where total time endowment per
period is normalized to unity. In their second period, individuals are assumed to be
retired.3 More precisely, I assume that i-th individual’s preferences are represented by
the following utility function.
U (ci1,t , c
i










1 − σ1 , (1)
for i = 1, 2, . . ., I, I denoting the number of individual types, where β ∈ (0, 1)
denotes the subjective discount factor, and parameters σ1 and σ2 are such that if
σ1 ∈ (0, 1), then σ2 ∈ (0, 1); and if σ1 > 1, then σ2 < 0. Some remarks follow
Eq. (1). First, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption is given by
IES = 1/σ1. And, second, the preferences over life-time consumption and leisure
there represented are compatible with balanced growth along the steady state. Note
that labor supply along the balanced growth path must be constant, while per capita
first-period consumption and the wage rate grow at the same rate: i.e. the marginal
rate of substitution between cit and 1 − nit must fall at the same rate as the inverse of
the (net-of-tax) wage rate.
Progressive income taxation implies that individuals with different incomes face
different tax rates. In this simple economy, there are two sources of individual het-
erogeneity: age and labor skills. Thus, the average tax rate that a young (resp. old)
i-th type individual is charged is denoted by τ i1 (resp. τ
i
2), its precise nature being
discussed below. Tax rates are assumed time-invariant for simplicity, so that they are
not affected by a time subscript.4
Denoting the i-th type individual’s skill parameter by θ i > 0, thefirst-period savings
at t by sit , the wage rate per unit of labor at t bywt , and the net-of-depreciation interest
rate paid at t + 1 by rt+1, one obtains the first- and second-period individual budget
constraints as
3 The first subscript denotes age (1, young; 2, adult) and the second subscript denotes calendar time.
Superscript i trivially denotes individual’s type. Given that second period labor supply is identically equal
to 1, nit does not require a second subscript.
4 In this paper I am assuming that all sources of income are aggregated to assess an individual’s tax bill.
It corresponds to what is known in the literature as a “comprehensive” or “global income tax”, as opposed
to a “schedular or dual income tax” (see Kleinbard 2010, p. 41).
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1 + (1 − τ i2)rt+1
]
sit , (3)
respectively for i = 1, 2, . . ., I .
Thus, substituting ci1,t and c
i
2,t+1 from Eqs. (2) and (3), respectively, into the objec-
tive function in Eq. (1), and maximizing the resulting equation with respect to sit and






























1 − σ1 c
i
1,t , (5)
for i = 1, 2, . . ., I . Equation (4) represents the standard Euler equation for optimal
consumption plans for two consecutive periods. Notice the term ∂τ i2/∂s
i
t on the right-
hand side of Eq. (4): if the income tax schedule is progressive, the tax rate that an
i-th type old individual faces becomes endogenous (increasing in his/her savings,
sit ). Equation (5) represents the standard optimal consumption-leisure choice: the
marginal utility of consumption times the foregone consumption units as a result of
one additional unit of leisure, the latter being θ iwt
(






the marginal utility of leisure. Similarly to Eq. (4), the term ∂τ i1/∂n
i
t must show up in
Eq. (5), denoting the endogenous nature of the tax rate charged to an i-th type young
individual.
2.2 Firms
Let us suppose that a profit maximizing firm f acts competitively in the output and
production factor (capital and labor) markets without adjustment costs in production









t − wt N ft − (rt + δ)K ft (6)






k1−αt , A > 0
where Y ft denotes output, N
f
t denotes labor (in efficiency units), K
f
t denotes physical
capital, α ∈ (0, 1) denotes the capital income share, and δ stands for the physical
capital depreciation rate. Some remarks concerning production technology follow.
First, I assume that all firms (uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]) exhibit the
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same production technology. Second, I also assume that there is a positive externality
in the production process so that f -th firm’s output depends not only on the inputs
hired by that firm, but also on the average number of units of capital per unit of labor









t d f . The intended consequence is that this economy will display
an AK technology in equilibrium, where Yt = AKt , thereby allowing for sustained
economic growth which will be constant, i.e. with no transitional dynamics.5
The solution to the problem in Eq. (6) is given by the factor price equations
rt = αA − δ, and wt = (1 − α)Akt . (7)
Thus, the user cost of capital will be constant, αA, but the wage rate,wt = (1−α)Akt ,
will grow at the same rate as the aggregate stock of capital per unit of labor.
2.3 Government
A government sector is introduced in the following way: it taxes capital and labor
incomes with the same tax code, capital depreciation is completely deductible, and
tax revenues are used to finance an exogenous stream of public expenditure, Gt , which
(for the sake of analytical convenience) is expressed as a constant proportion, γ > 0,
of aggregate output (i.e. Gt = γ Yt ).
Concerning the income tax code, I will suppose this to be of the particular class
introduced by Benabou (2002) and Heathcote et al. (2014), where the tax rate that the
i-th individual is charged depends on how his/her income, yia,t , is related to average
(i.e. per capita) income, yt .6 Thus, the average tax rate paid by individual i with age
a and income yia,t is given by






for i = 1, 2, . . .I , for some ξ > 0 (to be endogenously obtained when solving the
macroeconomic equilibrium), and φ ≥ 0, where a = {1, 2} for young and old indi-
viduals respectively. Thus, Eq. (8) implies that the marginal tax rate faced by this
individual, ∂
(
τ ia × yia,t
)
/∂yia,t , equals τˆ
i
a = 1 − (1 − φ)(1 − τ ia). This way, the ratio
(τˆ ia − τ ia)/(1 − τ ia) = φ provides us with a natural indicator of the progressivity of
the tax schedule, independent of the income level at which it is evaluated. Note that if
φ = 0, income taxation is proportional and τˆ ia = τ ia ; φ > 0 if and only dτ ia/dyia,t > 0,
5 Despite the fact that some studies have questioned the empirical relevance of the AK growth model, e.g.
Jones (1995), there are numerous empirical works in the economic literature that have found this approach
an appropriate way to explain observed growth data. See, among others, McGrattan (1998), Li (2002) or
Cunado et al. (2009), for the standard one-sector version of the AK model, or Farmer and Lahiri (2006) who
consider a two-sector extended version of the model.
6 For alternative ways to model income tax progressivity, including the one I follow here see Guner et al.
(2014a). They consider four specifications of the average tax rates and estimate them for the U.S. economy.
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i.e. the tax schedule is progressive; and if ϕ = 1, after-tax income for i-th type individ-
ual equals
(
1 − τ ia
)
yia,t = ξ yt : i.e. income is completely redistributed. Consequently,
this tax scheme naturally suggests two bounds for the progressivity measure, 0 and 1.
The specification of the tax rates in Eq. (8) allows us to rewrite the first-order necessary















θ iwt (1 − φ)(1 − τ i1) =
σ2
1 − σ1 c
i
1,t , (10)
for i = 1, 2, . . .I . Simple inspection of Eqs. (9) and (10) shows that along the balanced
growth path, at which the interest rate is constant [see Eq. (7)], ci1,t , c
i
2,t and wt must
grow at the same rate, thereby guaranteeing that nit = ni for all t .
3 Competitive equilibrium
Once both the private sector and the government have been introduced, I next solve
for the competitive equilibrium.
Labor market equilibrium Equilibrium in the labor market is trivially obtained.
Using Jt to denote the number of young individuals at t , equilibrium in the labor
market (expressed in efficiency units) is given by
Nt = Jt × n˜t , (11)
where the left-hand side denotes aggregate labor demand and the right-hand side repre-
sents aggregate labor supply, n˜t standing for average effective labor supply per young
individual, i.e. n˜t ≡ ∑Ii=1 θ i pi nit , and pi denoting the (time invariant) proportion of
i-th type individuals (i.e. pi ≥ 0 and ∑Ii=1 pi = 1).
Goods market equilibrium As is standard in 2-period OLGmodels with no financial
assets at birth, equilibrium in the goods market requires that the aggregate of young
individuals’ savings be equal to the next period’s aggregate stock of capital. Therefore,
it must be the case that s˜t = (1 + m)kˆt+1, where s˜t ≡ ∑Ii=1 pi sit represents average
savings per young individual, and kˆt ≡ Kt/Jt , i.e. the aggregate stock of capital per
young individual as of time t .
Tax rates in equilibrium We are now ready to solve for the tax rates that young and
old individuals face. Firstly, from Eqs. (2) and (7), the i-th type young individual’s
gross income at time t equals
yi1,t = (1 − α)θ i nit Akt , (12)
for i = 1, 2, . . ., I . Secondly, from Eqs. (3) and (7), one obtains that the i-th type old
individual’s (taxable) income at time t equals
yi2,t = sit−1(αA − δ), (13)
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for i = 1, 2, . . .I . Third, the aggregate income across young individuals as of time
t is given by
∑I
i p
i Jt yi1,t = Jt (1 − α)Akˆt , where I have used Eqs. (11) and (12).
Denoting the number of old individuals at time t as Vt , the aggregate income across
old individuals at time t is given by
∑I
i p
i Vt yi2,t = Vt (αA−δ)(1+m)kˆt , where I have
used the equilibrium condition in the goods market and Eq. (13). Therefore, noting
that Vt = Jt (1+ m)−1, aggregate (taxable) income at time t is given by (A − δ)Jt kˆt .7
Or, equivalently, per capita income at time t , yt , equals
yt = (A − δ)kˆt
1 + (1 + m)−1 . (14)
Fourth, from Eqs. (12) to (14) it is straightforward to obtain the relative before-tax






= (1 − α)A
[
1 + (1 + m)−1]




= (αA − δ)(2 + m)
A − δ μ
i , (15)
for i = 1, 2, . . .I , where ηi ≡ θ i nit/n˜t and μi ≡ sit−1/s˜t−1 denote the shares respec-
tively of (effective) labor supply and savings of the i-th type individual. Therefore,
relative before-tax incomes do depend on government policy [characterized by para-
meters γ , ξ and φ] through the effect of tax rates on relative labor supplies (the ηi ’s)
and savings (the μi ’s). Substituting yi1,t/yt and y
i
2,t/yt from Eq. (15) into Eq. (8)
finally yields the equilibrium average tax rates, τ i1 and τ
i
2, respectively as
τ i1 = 1 − ξ
{
(1 − α)A [1 + (1 + m)−1]




τ i2 = 1 − ξ
{
(αA − δ)(2 + m)




for i = 1, 2, . . .I . Note that relative before-tax incomes (and, therefore, the tax rates)
are time-invariant (because, as shown below, the ηi ’s and the μi ’s are also time invari-
ant).
Fifth, I impose the condition of government budget balance on a period basis,
γ Yt = ∑Ii Jt × pi × τ i1,t × yi1,t +
∑I
i Vt × pi × τ i2,t × yi2,t , where the left-hand side
denotes government spending. The right-hand side represents income tax proceeds:
the first term denotes taxes paid by the young, while the second term represents taxes
paid by the old.
It can be shown that the average (income weighted) of the difference between 1 and
the individuals’ marginal tax rates is given by (1−φ)× [∑Ii pi × (1− τ i1,t )× yi1,t +











the term multiplying 1− φ is nothing but the average of the difference between 1 and
7 Recall that capital depreciation is assumed completely deductible.
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the individuals’ average tax rates. Therefore, φ represents not only the progressivity
measure at the individual level, but also economy-wide.
Growth In this paper I solve for the equilibrium growth rate of the stock of capital




/kˆt . Given a
constant population growth rate, the growth rate of the stock of capital per capita is
also g, and so is the growth rate of the stock of capital per unit of labor. Thus, the
condition for equilibrium in the goods market can be rewritten as
s˜t = (1 + m)(1 + g)kˆt . (18)
Some remarks follow. First, the equilibrium growth rate, g, is constant always, a
standard feature of AK growth models. And, second, all per capita variables grow
at the same rate. Thus, from Eq. (14) the (gross) rate of growth of yt is given by
yt+1/yt = 1 + g. From Eqs. (2), (7) and (8), one has that ci1,t/kˆt = (1 − τ i1)ηi (1 −
α)A − μi (1+ m)(1+ g) is constant, for i = 1, 2, . . .I . Further, from Eq. (2) and (7),
one obtains that sit /kˆt is also constant and somust be s˜t/kˆt [see Eq. (18)]. Finally, from
Eqs. (3), (7) and (18) it follows that c2,t/kˆt = μi (1+ m)(1− τ i2)(αA − δ) is constant
too. Therefore, if policy parameters γ, ξ and φ are constant, then yt , c1,t , sit , c2,t , kˆt
and kt would grow at the same rate, g.
We are now in a position to define rigorously the competitive equilibrium.







t , kt+1, yt
}t=∞, i=I
t=0, i=1 , and factor prices for labor and capital {wt , r}
t=∞
t=0 ,





i=1, such that for a government expenditure to G D P ratio, γ , tax code para-
meters ξ and φ, and some initial kˆ0 > 0, at any time t , households maximize utility
[Eqs. (2), (3), (9) and (10) hold]; firms maximize profits [Eq. (7) holds]; the govern-
ment budget equations hold [Eqs. (16) and (17) plus budget balance hold]; markets for
labor and physical capital clear [Eqs. (11) and (18) hold], per capita income is given




/kˆt , where kˆt ≡ kt × n˜.
Given that the economy grows over time, and in order to solve the model numer-
ically, per capita variables must be redefined relative to some variable that grows at
the same rate so that the ratios along the balanced-growth path remain constant. A
natural candidate for that purpose is the stock of capital per young individual, kˆt .
Therefore, the competitive equilibrium is defined in terms of transformed variables,
so that some of the equations in Definition 1 must be rewritten accordingly. Thus,
first- and second-period budget constraints in Eqs. (2) and (3) become
cˆi1 + sˆi = θ i ni (1 − τ i1)wˆ, (19)
cˆi2 = sˆi (1 + g)−1[1 + (1 − τ i2)r ], (20)
for i = 1, 2, . . .I , respectively, where, by definition, cˆi1 ≡ ci1,t/kˆt , cˆi2 ≡ ci2,t/kˆt ,
sˆi ≡ sit /kˆt , and wˆ ≡ (1− α)A/n˜. Similarly, the Euler equation in (9) and the optimal
consumption-leisure choice equation in (10) become
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1 + (1 − ϕ)(1 − τ i2)r
]
(21)
(1 − ni )θ i wˆ(1 − φ)(1 − τ i1) =
σ2
1 − σ1 cˆ
i
1 (22)
for i = 1, 2, . . .I . The goods market equilibrium condition in Eq. (18) becomes
sˆ = (1 + g)(1 + m), (23)
where sˆ ≡ ∑Ii=1 pi sˆi = s˜t/kˆt , and per capita income in Eq. (14) is given by yˆ ≡
yt/kˆt = (A − δ)/[1 + (1 + m)−1]. The rest of the equations in Definition 1 need
not be rewritten.
The endogenous variables in Definition 1 are highly non-linear functions of para-
meters in household preferences, firms’ technological constraint and government tax
policy. As a consequence, the very setup of the model prevents one from obtaining
analytical results, so that numerical methods must be used to solve for the equilibrium
and the response of the economy to government policy changes.
4 Welfare
A final issue to consider is that of welfare, i.e. what the relationship is between
income tax code progressivity and social welfare. Assume that at time t the govern-
ment sought the progressivity index that maximized a discounted sum of the average




i=1 pi Jt+ j U(






, for some social discount factor D > 0. After normalizing
the number of young individuals at time t so that Jt ≡ 1, recalling that m denotes the



















1 − nit+ j
)σ2











for Dˆ ≡ D(1+m) (seeDe la Croix andMichel 2002, chap. 2). Dividing the expression
in Eq. (24) by kˆ1−σ1t = [kˆt+ j (1 + g)− j ]1−σ1 and rearranging terms, one obtains the
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where cˆi1 and cˆ
i
2 have been defined right after Definition 1 in Sect. 3.
8 Finally, after
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Dˆ [1 + g(φ)]1−σ1
} j
, (26)
where individual optimal decisions, cˆi1, n
i and cˆi2, as well as the growth rate, g, are
made explicitly dependent on φ, and function SW F is explicitly made dependent of φ
and D. For the problem to be well defined, SW F(φ, D)must be bounded above; or, in
other words, D, m, σ1 and equilibrium g must be such that D < (1+g)σ1−1/(1+m).9
Thus, assuming that this condition holds, Eq. (26) leads to
SWF(φ, D) ≡ 1
(σ1 − 1)
{














Finding an analytical expression relating SWF(φ, D) to φ would be unfeasible. As
usually seen in the literature, though, one way to quantify the gain in utility as a result
of some given tax policy change relative to the benchmark (or status quo) case con-
sists of calculating the proportional change in life-time benchmark consumption that
would leave agents indifferent between the two situations (in short, the consumption-
equivalent variation, which can always be computed numerically).
Before obtaining such a variation, some explanation about how a change in φ is
implemented in this economy is needed. Imagine that the economywere in benchmark
economy at t − 1, and that an unannounced change in φ were introduced at time t .
Young individuals (born at time t)wouldmake their optimal plans about consumption,
saving and labor supply according to the new tax regime (characterized by φ = φ∗),
so that the economy would be in the new steady state at t+1. Old individuals at time
t (born at t − 1) however, would have already made their saving (and first-period
consumption and labor supply) decisions at t − 1 according to the old tax regime
(characterized by φ = φ0), so that they would be forced to change their optimal plans
for second-period consumption. The assumption made is that old individuals at time
8 Equation (25) can be easily interpreted as follows. Imagine that the utility function in Eq. (1) depended
on the number of pounds of apples that one individual born at t + j consumed when young, c1,t+ j , and
when old, c2,t+ j+1. We could always rewrite it in terms of the number of apples eaten by that individual
when young and when old (cˆ1 and cˆ2 respectively) if the weight of apples between t+ j and t+ j+1 grew at
a rate g.
9 Note that if σ1 > 1 (as will be the case in the numerical exercise carried out below), the upper bound on
D is increasing in g. This implies that in order to make welfare comparisons for different values of φ, D
must be low enough as higher progressivity levels will lead to lower equilibrium growth rates.
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t would pay taxes with the new progressivity index, φ∗, but with a transitory value
for parameter ξ in Eq. (8) which guaranteed that government budget would balance
at time t .
Thus, denoting that change by λ, it can be shown after some algebra that λ is given
by
λ(φ∗, φ0, D) =
[
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0, φ∗) denoting the (normalized) second-period consumption for an i-th type
individual who is born in a φ0 tax regime and dies in a φ∗ tax regime.
5 Results
5.1 Calibration
Here I set the parameter values for the benchmark case that I use in the simulation
exercises in the next Section. In choosing the appropriate values, I will make themodel
economy mimic some stylized facts of the US economy. Table 1 shows the parameter
values, Table 2 compares the simulated equilibrium aggregate values to the target
values of the corresponding variables, and Table 3 shows the benchmark individual
equilibrium.10
Preferences Parameter β is set equal to 0.7397. I obtain this value by assuming a
yearly subjective discount factor of 0.99 (just slightly <1), and that 1 model period
represents 30years of calendar time. The reason for this choice (above more often
used values in the literature) is that a negative relationship between the subjective
discount factor and the equilibrium interest rate appears.11 I set σ1 = 2, which implies
IES = 0.5, “the median of the estimates in the literature.”12 Parameter σ2 is obtained
10 In general,allparameters are expected to influenceall equilibriumvariables.When aparticular parameter
is associated with a particular endogenous variable, it is because the former is expected to affect the latter
quantitatively most.
11 The equilibrium yearly interest rate turns out to equal 8.7%. Although a seemingly too high value and
above standards, Poterba (1998) found a real return on capital of 8.6% using NIPA data on capital income
flows and BEA capital stock data, and Gomme and Rupert (2007) obtained an implied pre-tax real interest
rate of 13.2% in an article specifically focusing on calibration of macroeconomicmodels. Simple inspection
of Eq. (7) explains why it is difficult to mimic observed interest rates in this economy: α is reserved to
replicate the capital income share, A turns out to be the key parameter to replicate the equilibrium growth
rate, and δ is bounded between 0 and 1.
12 See Caldara et al. (2009).
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Table 1 Parameter values: benchmark case
Preferences β = 0.7397 σ1 = 2.00 σ2 = −2.2445
Demographics m = 0.368 θ1 = 1.000 θ2 = 1.560 θ3 = 1.959
θ4 = 2.420 θ5 = 3.676 pi = 0.2 for i = 1, 2, . . . , 5
Technology α = 0.377 δ = 0.996 A = 32.820
Government γ = 0.1543 φ = 0.036 ξ = 0.8437
Figures correspond to the exogenous and calibrated model parameters
Table 2 Simulated and target aggregate values
Variable Simulated (%) Target (%)
Annual per capita growth rate 1.92 1.92
Average hours of work 1/3 1/3
Annual population growth rate 1.05 1.05
Capital income share 37.7 37.7
Income tax progressivity index 0.036 0.036
Government consumption share 15.43 15.43
Annual investment-GDP ratio 18.1 18.1
Share of total after tax
Lifetime income by quintile
First quintile 9.7 9.7
Second quintile 14.9 14.9
Third quintile 18.56 18.56
Fourth quintile 22.76 22.76
Fifth quintile 34.08 34.08
Figures in column 2 correspond to the simulated values of magnitudes listed in column 1 Figures in column
3 correspond to the respective observed values
endogenously and equals −2.2445. In this way, the average labor supply, ∑Ii pi ni ,
equals 1/3, a standard choice (see e.g.Conesa et al. 2009; Fuentes-Albero et al. 2009).13
The additional result is a Marshallian labor supply elasticity of 0.003 with respect to
the after-tax wage rate for the average individual, i.e. that with an average skill level.
Thus, differences among the labor supplies of the 5 individuals that I will introduce a
few lines below turn out to be negligible: n1 = 0.3330, n2 = 0.3332, n3 = 0.3333,
n4 = 0.3334 and n5 = 0.3336. Some remarks on this issue follow. First, this can be no
surprise, but a direct consequence of the preferences represented by Eq. (1). Ideally,
labor supply elasticity should also be targeted in the calibration exercise and replicated
by this model economy, rather than obtained and ex-post compared to observed values.
13 The U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics reports 67 h per week worked by a married
couple between 25 and 54 years in 2000 (see Working in the 21st Century, http://www.bls.gov/opub/
working/page17b.htm). Assuming 100h per week per person as the available discretionary time yields that
figure.
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1 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.33302 0.136 0.128 0.167 0.160
2 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.33323 0.150 0.142 0.181 0.173
3 1.9 1.9 1.9 0.33334 0.157 0.149 0.187 0.180
4 2.3 2.3 2.4 0.33344 0.163 0.155 0.194 0.186
5 3.5 3.4 3.6 0.33364 0.176 0.168 0.206 0.198








i /s1 denote relative to type 1 individual young and old consumption and
young savings respectively. Additionally, ni : labor supply; τ i1 and τ
i
2: average tax rates for young and adult;
and τˆ i1 and τˆ
i
2: marginal tax rates for young and adult
But, of course, compatibility of preferences with endogenous balanced growth path
imposes tight restrictions on those as is well known in the profession (see King et
al. 1988). And, second, empirical microeconomic estimates of the elasticity of hours
worked for the U.S. economy are substantially low, ranging between −0.1 and 0.2 for
men and single women, and 0.1 and 0.3 for married women (see Kimball and Shapiro
2010; McClelland and Mok 2012).14
Technology I assume α = 0.377, thus representing the capital income share.15
Parameter A is obtained endogenously and equals 32.820. This allows one to obtain a
(30-year) growth rate of per capita GDP of g = 76.92%, corresponding to an annual
growth rate of ga = 1.92%.16 I endogenously obtain δ in a straightforward manner.
Consider the law of motion for the aggregate stock of capital, Ka,t , on an annual basis,
Ia,t = Ka,t+1 − (1 − δa)Ka,t , where Ia,t denotes gross investment at period t and δa
stands for the (annual) physical capital depreciation rate. Assuming a balanced growth
rate path for Ka,t , so that Ka,t+1 = Ka,t (1 + ga)(1 + ma), where ma denotes the
annual population growth rate, and (once again) that 1model period represents 30 years
of calendar time, one has that Ia,t/Ya,t = [(1 + ga)(1 + ma) − (1 − δa)]/(A/30),
where Ya,t = (A/30)Ka,t trivially denotes annual GDP at period t. Equivalently,
Ia,t/Ya,t = [(1 + ga)(1 + ma) − (1 − δ)1/30]/(A/30). Finally, assuming an annual
14 As Keane (2011) concludes, however, there exists a controversy over the responsiveness of labor supply
to changes in wages and taxes: even though (at least for males) most economists believe labor supply
elasticities are small, a considerable minority of studies finds large values. Additionally, estimates of small
labor supply elasticities based on micro data are consistent with large aggregate labor supply elasticities.
This is the result obtained when simple labor supply decision micro models are enriched with the sort
of dynamics induced by human capital accumulation, or when macro models allow for presence of the
extensive margin (Keane and Rogerson 2012).
15 The Congressional Budget Office (2006, p. 36), reports an average labor income share of 0.623 between
1950 and 2005.
16 Author’s calculation for the sample period running between 1980 and 2005. See Table 679. Selected Per
Capita Income and Product Measures in Current and Chained (2005) Dollars: 1960 to 2010, in “Income,
Expenditures, Poverty, and Wealth”, p. 443, U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States:
2012.
123
SERIEs (2015) 6:43–72 59
population growth rate of 0.0105 (to be justified a few lines below), setting δ = 0.996
allows one to mimic the observed value for Ia,t/Ya,t , 0.181.17
Government I set the government consumption share of GDP, γ , equal to 15.43%,
the observed average value for the sample period running between 1980 and 2000.18
As for the income tax progressivity index, I set φ = 0.036, the estimated value from
Internal Revenue Service micro data for 2000 reported in, Guner et al. (2014a, Table
10, p. 15). The resulting equilibrium value for parameter ξ in Eq. (8) turns out to equal
0.8437.
Demographics According to the IMFWorld Economic Outlook Database, October
2010, the average annual population growth rate between 1980 and 2007 was 0.0105.
Following the above assumption onmodel periods and calendar time, I set m = 0.368.
As for the skill distribution, θ1 is normalized to 1. The remaining skill parameters
are set to pin down the income distribution. More precisely, assuming a uniform





0.2, I = 5), the chosen θ ’s are able to replicate the observed shares of lifetime
income (wage earnings), net of taxes and transfers, corresponding to the quintiles in
1986.19 Given that the model period represents 30years, it makes sense to target the
distribution of the sum of discounted labor incomes over the same time interval, rather
than the observed income distribution in some given single period. As a result of the
unavailability of that piece of data, however, the target is proxied by the whole lifetime
net-of-tax earnings and matched by the distribution of net-of-tax labor incomes across
active (i.e. first-period) individuals. The resulting θ ’s are θ2 = 1.560, θ3 = 1.959,
θ4 = 2.420, and θ5 = 3.676. As by-products, the model implies both a higher Gini
inequality index for market incomes than for after-tax incomes (0.250 vs. 0.243), and
very close Gini income inequality indices for labor and capital incomes, the former
being slightly higher (0.234 vs. 0.229, respectively).20
Three natural patterns of individual behavior arise from the inspection of Table 3.
First, more skilled individuals end up enjoying higher levels of consumption (in both
periods), generating higher savings, and facing higher tax rates (both average and
marginal). Second, young (i.e. active) individuals are systematically charged higher
tax rates than adult (i.e. retired) agents. And, third, labor supply is (almost) invariant
across different type individuals.
17 Author’s calculation for the sample period 1980–2005. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 1.1.5.
Gross Domestic Product, Last Revised on: June 25, 2014, available at http://www.bea.gov/itable/index.
cfm.
18 This consists of all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including
compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditures on national defense and security, but
excludes governmentmilitary expenditures that are part of government capital formation. SeeUnited States:
General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP), available at http://www.quandl.com/
WORLDBANK/USA_NE_CON_GOVT_ZS-United-States-General-government-final-consumption-exp
enditure-of-GDP .
19 Source: author’s calculations after Fullerton and Lim Rogers (1993), Tables 4–10. Characteristics of
Lifetime Categories, p. 114.
20 It is a natural result that both inequality indices turn out to be so close to each other. Individuals’ abilities
determine first period (labor) income distribution, and second period (capital) incomes depend only on first
period savings. The observed fact, however, is that capital ownership (and income) is more concentrated
than labor income (see, e.g. Piketty 2014, p. 174; Piketty and Saez 2014, p. 839).
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5.2 Findings
The numerical experiment run in this paper consists of analyzing the effects of changes
in income tax progressivity upon long-term growth when this is based on physical
capital accumulation, income inequality, and social welfare for a wide enough range
of non-negative values of φ and D. Three previous remarks are in order. First, this is a
revenue-neutral tax experiment in that changes in φ are accompanied by the necessary
changes in parameter ξ , so that total tax revenues represent a constant fraction, γ ,
of aggregate output [see Eq. (8) and the condition for government budget balance].21
Second, the theoretically sensible range of values for φ is the closed interval [0,1]
where, as stated in Sect. 2.3, φ = 0 represents the flat (proportional) tax case; and
φ = 1 characterizes the complete redistribution case. Note, however, that the latter
extreme case implies that marginal tax rates equal 1, so that the first order necessary
condition in Eq. (10) admits no defined solution. And, third, as already mentioned
in Sect. 2.2, the AK feature of the aggregate technology prevents the existence of
transitional dynamic effects. Results follow in this order: individual, aggregate, and
welfare effects.
Individual effects First, concerning the tax rates, this model economy predicts that,
as expected, and for a givenφ, higher levels of skills are associatedwith higher incomes
and, consequently, higher average tax rates. And, for any given individual type, active
(i.e. young) individuals bear higher tax rates than retirees (i.e. old).22 Concerning the
response obtained after changes in φ, as the tax code is made more progressive, the
average tax rates faced by young individuals of types 4 and 5 become higher, while type
3 young individuals’ remain fairly invariant, and type 1 and 2 young individuals’ fall.
Actually, type 1 individuals become subsidized for values of φ higher than around 0.23
(i.e. negative average tax rates). As a result, the dispersion of average tax rates faced by
young individuals rises which, in turn, will help explain the effect of changes in the tax
progressivity upon (net-of-tax) income inequality (see Fig. 1). As for old individuals’
average tax rates, responses to a changing φ are not monotonic. For low enough values
(below around 0.55), the pattern followed by type 5 individuals’ is increasing in φ,
while types 1 through 4 individuals’ tax rates are decreasing, so that tax rates of type
1 and type 2 individuals would eventually become negative, as anticipated a few lines
above. For high values of φ, however, the distorting effect would be so strong, that
further increments in φ would lead to lower average tax rates for type 5 adults (because
of the large reduction in their savings) and higher tax rates (but still negative) for type
1 and type 2 adults (see Fig. 2).
21 Defining revenue-neutrality as keeping G/Y constant across tax progressivity regimes could be simply
justified by saying that most of G are payments to government employees, so that if wages change, G
should change proportionally. I owe this interpretation to an anonymous referee.
22 This is a natural result (given the progressive nature of the tax schedule) as equilibrium incomes turn out
to be higher for active workers than for retirees. According to Table 670. Money Income of Households—
Distribution by Income level and Selected Characteristics: 2006, inU.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract
of the United States: 2009, p. 443, household median incomes follow an inverted-U pattern relative to the
age of the householder, with the minimum being attained for households whose householder was 65 years
old and over.
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Fig. 1 Progressivity and average tax rates (young)






























Fig. 2 Progressivity and average tax rates (old)
Second, concerning the labor supply decision, the distortionary effects implied by
higher tax progressivity induce a sharp reduction in the labor supply of all types of
individuals, with no (substantial) differences across different type individuals (see
Fig. 3 where individual labor supplies (almost) overlap each other). As pointed out in
the Introduction, this calls for the need to allow for endogenous labor supply when
analyzing the effects of taxation on economic growth when this is driven by physical
capital accumulation and investment is financed out of young (workers’) savings,
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Fig. 3 Progressivity and labor supply
even though (as is the case) labor supply elasticity is close to zero. Heathcote et al.
(2014) also find that higher income tax progresssivity discourages labor supply. Along
these lines, empirical evidence has found that even with low (zero) Marshallian labor
supply elasticity, large Hicks elasticities imply large negative labor supply effects of
progressive taxation (see Keane 2011, p. 983).
Third, as for first-period savings, those of individuals of types 3 through 5 fall as
a result of increasing progressivity, in particular most skilled ones’, type 5. Type 2
individuals’ remain fairly constant (except for high levels of φ, around 0.45, getting
lower thereafter); and those of Type 1, i.e. the least skilled, show an increasing pattern
(except for unlikely high values of φ around 0.8). This last result is well explained
because (aswe have just seen above), old type 1 and type 2 individuals face diminishing
tax rates as φ increases, becoming subsidized at some point (see Fig. 4). Needless to
say, the response of average first-period savings to be discussed a few lines below
is critically relevant in this model economy as economic growth is physical capital
driven.
Aggregate effects First, parameter ξ displays a fairly invariant pattern with respect
to φ as it plays a minor role in the tax code: given the reactions of individuals’ choices
after changes in the progressivity parameter, ξ is just endogenously adjusted so as to
obtain budget balance (see Table 4, column 2).
Second, as advanced above, the model economy predicts a positive relationship
between φ and equilibrium leisure. The intuition behind the result is found as a com-
pound effect on young individuals’ marginal tax rates and consumption levels after
rewriting Eq. (22) as [σ2/(1 − σ1)](1 − ni ) = cˆi1/[θ i wˆ(1 − tˆ i1)]. Thus, the numeri-
cal simulation shows that, following an increment in φ, for most (resp. least) skilled
individuals both first-period consumption, cˆi1, and the net-of-marginal-tax wage rate in
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Savings of Young Individuals.
Fig. 4 Progressivity and savings
Table 4 Tax progressivity
φ ξ n¯ S(%) ga(%) Gb Ga
0.0 0.84 0.34 7.44 1.95 0.25 0.25
0.1 0.85 0.32 7.26 1.87 0.24 0.23
0.2 0.85 0.29 7.06 1.77 0.24 0.20
0.3 0.86 0.26 6.84 1.66 0.23 0.18
0.4 0.86 0.24 6.58 1.53 0.22 0.15
0.5 0.86 0.20 6.28 1.37 0.21 0.13
0.6 0.86 0.17 5.92 1.18 0.20 0.11
0.7 0.85 0.13 5.50 0.92 0.19 0.08
0.8 0.85 0.09 4.96 0.58 0.19 0.05
0.9 0.85 0.05 4.22 0.04 0.20 0.02
Aggregate effects Aggregate variables in equilibrium according to the notation introduced in the main text.
ξ has been introduced in the tax schedule in Eq. (8); n¯ ≡ ∑Ii=1 pi ni stands for the average hours of work;
S denotes the ratio of aggregate young savings to aggregate output; ga denotes the annual per capita GDP
growth rate; Gb and Ga stand for the Gini index of before- tax and net-of-tax incomes respectively
efficiency units, θ i wˆ(1− tˆ i1), turn out to fall (resp. rise) in such a way that the net effect
on the right-hand side of the last equation is always positive (see Table 4, column 3).
As a by-product the model predicts a positive relationship between the (normalized)
wage rate, wˆ, and φ: from Eq. (7) and the definitions of wˆ ≡ wt/kˆt , kˆt ≡ Kt/Nt and
n˜ ≡ ∑Ii=1 θ i pi ni , one has that wˆ = (1 − α)A/n˜.
Third, young individuals’ aggregate savings relative to aggregate output fall as a
result of increasing levels of progressivity as pointed out above: except for the least
skilled individuals, higher values of φ end up inducing lower first-year savings, in
particular for the most skilled workers (see Table 4, column 4).
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Fourth, and as a natural consequence of the above (given the role played by phys-
ical capital accumulation in this model), the model predicts a negative monotonic
relationship between progressivity and growth [see Eq. (18)]. Thus, having denoted
the annual growth rate by ga , the movement from the benchmark economy (i.e. with
a progressive income tax code) to a proportional income tax economy (i.e. φ = 0)
would make ga rise from 1.92 to 1.95%, a gain well below than that suggested by
Caucutt et al. (2003) (see Table 4, column 5). Available empirical evidence for OECD
countries supports a negative relationship between progressivity of personal income
taxes and growth (see, e.g. Arnold 2008, Table 2). One likely reason why the growth
effects of lowering the tax progressivity are lower than in Caucutt et al. (2003) is that
in the absence of intergenerational links, the distortionary effects of capital income
taxation are minimized.23
And, fifth, as for the income distribution, the model also predicts a positive relation-
ship between income tax progressivity and equality of income distribution, and higher
inequality of before-tax than after-tax incomes. More precisely, the Gini indices of
market and net-of-tax incomes, denoted by Gb and Ga respectively, display a decreas-
ing pattern relative to φ (see Table 4, columns 6 and 7). This is a natural result because,
as discussed above, increments in income tax progressivity lead to increasing tax rates
for more skilled agents and lower tax rates for less skilled. After all, given that tax
revenues represent a constant fraction of GDP, a higher progressivity must lead to a
reduction in net-of-tax income inequality. In short, income inequality would be maxi-
mized under a proportional tax scheme, φ = 0, and any increment in personal income
tax progressivity would reduce inequality.
Welfare effects Concerning welfare analysis, simple inspection of Eq. (27) shows
that higher progressivity leads to three different effects, one of which turns out to
display a negative sign, the second and the third one displaying a positive one. On
the one hand, increments in φ induce lower growth rates and, therefore, reduce the
well-being of current individuals and future generations’. This effect is captured by a
lower first term of the right-hand side of Eq. (27). Note that the social discount factor,
D, is a crucial element here: as D increases, so that future generations’ well-being is
more valued, this lower growth effect of progressivity becomes more relevant, thereby
calling for a lower progressivity. On the other hand, higher progressivity levels give
rise to lower inequality of after-tax incomes and, therefore, lower dispersion of optimal
consumption levels across individuals of different types, and more importantly, as the
numerical results reveal, higher levels of leisure. The latter effect is captured by ahigher
second term of the right-hand side of Eq. (27). The relationship between these three
effects could be interpreted as follows: a social planner would always value increasing
equality, but that would have the cost lowering consumption growth; increasing leisure
would be a (non-negigible) side effect.24
Table 5 summarizes the results. The table shows, for alternative values of D (ranging
between 0.1 and 1.2, including β = 0.7397), and in addition to the aggregates of Table
23 As opposed to Caucutt et al. (2003), this model implies (although for the sake of space saving the
results are not shown) that assuming proportional taxation, changes (increments) in the flat tax rate do
imply changes (reductions) in the equilibrium growth rate.
24 I owe this interpretation to an anonymous referee.
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Table 5 Tax progressivity
D
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 β 1.2
φW 0.90 0.87 0.80 0.74 0.66 0.58 0.49 0.45 0.10
λW (%) 62.45 60.67 54.97 47.43 38.97 30.14 21.38 18.01 −15.01
ξ 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.85
n¯ 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.22 0.32
S (%) 4.22 4.47 4.96 5.30 5.68 6.00 6.31 6.43 7.3
ga (%) 0.04 0.23 0.58 0.80 1.03 1.22 1.39 1.46 1.87
Gb 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.24
Ga 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.23
Welfare The table shows the optimal progressivity index φW and the associated welfare gain λW [see Eq.
(28)], along with some aggregates (see Table 4), for alternative values of the social discount factor D.
Column 9 has been obtained for D = β = 0.7397, the individual discount factor (see Table 1). Condition
D < (1 + g)σ1−1/(1 + m) is violated for D = β and φ ≥0.9. The highest admissible value for D is 1.2
(see note 28 and last column in this Table)
4, the social welfare maximizing progressivity index, φW , and the associated welfare
gain relative to the benchmark case, λW .25 The pattern shown in Table 5 is clear.
First, the optimal degree of progressivity is always positive. Second, that optimal
progressivity level is inversely related to how society values future generations’ well-
being.26 And, third, quantitative welfare gains at the optimum, in terms of equivalent
variation in consumption, largely depend on the social discount factor: as future well-
being is more valued, the welfare gains associated with optimal progressivity levels
tend to fall.
To illustrate how relatively important these three effects of tax progressivity are, one
can think about the following two experiments. Assume, first, that (almost) complete
redistributive taxes were optimal, so that ϕW = 0.9 (which is actually the case when
D = 0.1), with an associated welfare gain of 62.45% in terms of equivalent variation
in consumption (see Table 5, column 2). In this case, the welfare gain exclusively due
to eliminating consumption inequality equals 20.45% as an approximation.27
Assume, additionally, that such a low social discount factor meant that the growth
effect (which influences future consumption) were negligible. In this case, most of
the welfare gain, 42.0% = 62.45% − 20.45%, would be attributed to the increment
in leisure. Consider, instead, that ϕW = 0.9 were optimal regardless of the social
25 As noted above, D must not exceed the upper bound (1 + g)σ1−1/(1 + m).
26 See the Introduction in Bakis et al. (2014) for a similar conclusion.
27 This can be obtained in an easy manner. Note that labor supply is (nearly) independent of skill dis-
tribution, so that consumption distribution can be approximated by skill distribution. Therefore, an equal
consumption distribution can be proxied by an equal skill distribution. Thus, the corresponding welfare gain








where θ¯ ≡ 5−1 × ∑5i=1 θi , which (for the calibrated values of θi shown in Table 1 and σ1 = 2) equals
0.2045. I owe this point to an anonymous referee.
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Table 6 Complete redistribution (φ = 0.9), social discount factor and welfare
D
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 β
λ (%) 62.45 60.16 50.14 33.06 8.19 −26.57 −75.33 –
Welfare gains under the assumption of (almost) complete redistribution, i.e. φ = 0.9, and alternative social
discount factors. Aggregates are the same as those in Table 4, last row. As indicated in Table 5, λ cannot be
computed when D = β
discount factor and different values for D were tried. Note that, by construction, the
aggregates (leisure, growth and net-of-tax income inequality, in particular) would be
the same as those in Table 4, last row. This time differences in welfare gains (or losses)
would be exclusively due to differences in the valuation of the fall of the equilibrium
growth rates of future consumption (see Table 6). Thus, complete redistribution would
be welfare enhancing only for sufficiently low social discount factors: D ≤ 0.5. For
instance, the aforementioned gain inwelfare of 62.45%when D = 0.1, would become
a welfare loss of 75.33% for D = 0.7.
Two additional cases are worth pointing out. Consider, first, that D = β, i.e. the
subjective discount factor (see Table 5, column 9). The welfare maximizing progres-
sivity index, 0.45, and the associated welfare gain, 18.1%, sharply fall compared to
just above discussed case of D = 0.1. Despite both inequality of after-tax incomes
and labor supply fall compared to the benchmark economy (from 0.243 to 0.14, and
from 0.33 to 0.22 respectively), the equilibrium annual growth rate falls (from 1.92
to 1.46%). Thus, given the relatively high weight on future generations’ wellbeing,
the reduction in the growth rate explains the lower values of ϕW and λW . Finally,
consider the case of the highest admissible weight on future generations, namely
D = 1.2.28 (see Table 5, column 10). Social welfare is maximized by a very low pro-
gressivity index, 0.1, leading to a welfare loss compared to the benchmark economy:
λW = −15.01%. The intuition is straightforward: inequality of after-tax incomes and
labor supply are almost the same as in the benchmark economy (0.243 vs. 0.23, and
0.33 vs. 0.32 respectively). However, the equilibrium growth rate is lower than in the
benchmark economy (1.92 vs. 1.87%) and, and this is the key, the high social discount
factor heavily penalizes drops in the growth rate.
So far I have assumed that government spending represents a constant proportion
of GDP and that it is neither productive nor enters households’ preferences: two
assumptions often made in model economies focusing on taxation issues. These lead
to two unsatisfactory and related to each other consequences: higher growth rates
imply that more (current and future) resources in absolute terms are being wasted, and
that welfare effects of income tax policy only depend on how the tax burden is shared
by households but not on what the government does with tax revenues. Concerning the
latter, several alternatives are open. The governmentmight provide some infrastructure
in the form of public capital goods thereby influencing the equilibrium growth rate à
la Barro (1990); or it might subsidize human capital accumulation thereby affecting
28 It can be numerically shown that if D = 1.2 and ϕ ≥ 0.3, then D ≥ (1 + g)σ1−1/(1 + m).
123
SERIEs (2015) 6:43–72 67
equilibrium growth à la Benabou (2002); or it might provide some public consumption
good valued by households, so that government expenditure in equilibrium would
grow at the same rate as the economy. Bearing in mind how sustained equilibrium is
obtained in this model economy, it seems reasonable to choose the last among these
three alternatives. This issue is covered in the “Appendix” at the end of the paper. There
I show that, first, for a given value of the social discount factor, a higher valuation on
the part of individuals for the consumption of the publicly provided good implies a
lower welfare maximizing progressivity index. And, second, for a given valuation
of the consumption of the publicly provided good, a lower social discount of future
generations’ well-being calls for a lower welfare maximizing progressivity index. (see
the “Appendix” for details).
6 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the effects of income tax progressivity on long-run economic
growth, income inequality and social welfare.
The theoretical model used for this purpose is characterized by several key fea-
tures that, when they are considered together, make the paper differ from the existing
literature. The model economy does not allow for analytical solution, so that all the
results are numerical in nature. The quantitative implications of the model have been
illustrated after calibrating its parameters to mimic some basic stylized facts of the
US economy.
The findings of the paper can be classified into three main categories: individual,
aggregate, and social welfare related results. Increments in income tax progressivity
induce a drop in labor supply of all types of individuals (despite the zero labor supply
elasticity implied by preferences). Higher progressivity also reduces savings of all
individuals except the least skilled ones’. This result squareswith that on tax rates: least
skilled individuals’ average tax rates fall (even becoming negative, so that least skilled
individuals become subsidized), while the rest of individuals’ average tax rates rise.
As far as the aggregate effects are concerned, increases in income tax progressivity
lead to a fall in aggregate savings, which, given how the growth ismodeled, necessarily
translates into a drop in the equilibrium growth rate. For instance, eliminating the
progressivity andmoving to aflat tax regimewould raise the equilibriumannual growth
rate of per capita GDP from 1.92 to 1.95%. Furthermore, increasing the income tax
progressivity reduces the inequality in the distribution of both market and net-of-tax
incomes. Introducing a proportional income tax code would increase the Gini indices
of before-tax and after-tax incomes by 1 and 3.8% respectively.
Finally, regarding social welfare effects, optimality suggests the need of a political
choice between a more equal distribution of net income and consumption levels across
different types of individuals and higher levels of leisure and lower growth rates. The
size of the second, negative, effect critically depends on the social discount factor: if
the social planner discounts less future generations’ well-being, the optimal level of
progressivity will be lower. In addition, if the government tax proceeds are devoted to
the public provision of some private good rather than disposed, the optimal progres-
sivity level will also depend on how households value this public provision relative
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to private consumption: a higher valuation also implies a lower optimal progressivity
level, as progressivity also reduces the growth rate of the government-provided con-
sumption. At any rate, and for the parameter values considered, optimality requires
some degree of progressivity.
The paper can be improved in at least three directions: (1) increasing the number
of life-time periods to gain more realism, (2) allowing for a richer skill distribution
which would allow us to reproduce the observed wage distribution and (3) allowing
for a different treatment between labor and capital incomes in the spirit of Conesa et
al. (2009), thus abandoning the “comprehensive” or “global” approach.
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7 Appendix: Welfare sensitivity analysis: a public good in the utility function



















1 − σ1 , (30)
where qt denotes the per capita quantity of a publicly provided private good at time t ,
and π > 0 represents the relative preference for public good consumption over leisure
and private consumption. Note that Eq. (30) implies that preferences are additively
separable in private and public consumption, which is consistent with empirical evi-
dence (see Amano and Wirjanto 1998 for the U.S. economy case). Remembering that
Gt = γ Yt , Yt = AKt , and expressing total population as the sum of young plus old
individuals, one easily obtains that qt equals γ Akˆt/[1+ (1+m)−1], so that Definition
(3) of competitive equilibrium would need to be only slightly modified to include a
new variable, namely qˆ ≡ qt/kˆt . Given the way in which public good provision has
been introduced (i.e. with additive separability), the equilibrium allocation of (pri-
vate) consumption and leisure is invariant to preference parameter π . In other words,
changes in income tax progressivity will lead to the same individual and aggregate
effects obtained in Sect. 5.2, but to different welfare effects.
Assume, as before, that at time t the government sought the progressivity index that









2,t+1, nit , qt , qt+1
)
. Following sim-
ilar steps as in the previous setup in Sect. 2 without public provision, one would obtain
the (normalized) social welfare function to be maximized this time as
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SWFP (φ, π, D) ≡ SW F(φ, D)
+ 1









where the first term on the right-hand side, SW F(φ, D), has already been introduced
in Eq. (27); and the new, second term on the right-hand side trivially denotes the
effect of introducing the public provision. Note that this term depends on how pro-
gressivity influences growth, g(φ); how individuals value public provision, π ; and
how future generations’s well-being is discounted, D. Moreover, SW F P (φ, π, D) =
SW F(φ, D) if and only if π = 0. Proceeding in a similar way as when government
tax proceeds were just wasted, it is possible to compute the proportional change in
life-time benchmark private consumption that would leave agents indifferent between
the resulting equilibrium for some progressivity index φ∗ and the equilibrium under
the benchmark value φ0. Denoting that change by λ, it can be shown that λ is given
by
λ(φ∗, φ0, π, D)
=
[






for σ1 = 1, where SWF(·) and have been defined in Eqs. (27) and (29), respectively,
and (φ, π, D) has been introduced to denote the second term on the right-hand side
of Eq. (31). The difference(φ∗, ·)−(φ0, ·) trivially gives us different valuation of
the public provision between the two tax regimes. Simple inspection of Eqs. (31) and
(32) tells us that the welfare change corresponding to a movement in the progressivity
index fromφ0 toφ∗ also depends on how individuals value the public provision (i.e.π ).
The results of the experiment are shown in Fig. 5 where, for the same values of
the social discount factor D considered en Table 5, different arbitrary values of π are
tried. In particular, Fig. 5a shows how the social welfare maximizing progressivity
index, φW , relates to π for different values for D. The pattern is clear. First, for a
given value of D, a higher valuation on the part of individuals for the consumption of
the publicly provided good implies a lower φW . And, second, for a given π , a lower
social discount of future generations’ well-being (i.e. a higher D), requires a lower
φW .
The reason is a very simple one. The reductions in after-tax income inequality
(and, thereby, private consumption) and in the growth rate of (private and public)
consumption and the increment in leisure as a result of a higher φ do not depend on
whether the public good is provided or not, the separability assumption of preferences
trivially driving the result. However, more progressivity implies lower growth not only
of private consumption but also of the private good publicly provided. Therefore, a
higher valuation of the public provision will imply a lower optimal progressivity level.
And, for any given valuation of the public provision, a higher social discount factor
means that more weight is put on the growth effect of consumption (both public and
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Fig. 5 a Public good: optimal progressivity. b Public good: welfare gain
private) than on the inequality and leisure effects. For completeness, Fig. 5b shows
the welfare gain associated to φW , λW . As one would expect from the discussion just
made, λW is decreasing in both π and D. Needless to say, values of λW largely depend
on π , so that a natural question that arises here, of course, is that of the reasonable
value for π , but empirical work should shed light on this.
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